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Project Safe Neighborhoods (PSN) is a federally funded initiative that
brings together federal, state, and local law enforcement to reduce gun
violence in urban centers. In Chicago, PSN implemented supply-side gun
policing tactics, enhanced federal prosecution of gun crimes, and
notification forums warning offenders of PSN’s heightened criminal
sanctions. Prior evaluations provide evidence that PSN initiatives have
reduced crime in the first few years of their operation. But over a decade
after the program was established, we still know little about whether these
effects are sustained over an extended period of time. This Article examines
PSN Chicago, an anti-violence program in operation since 2002.
Consistent with a previous evaluation, we find that several program
components were associated with reductions in violence in the initial target
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areas. These associations, however, are concentrated in the first few years
of the intervention. We also examine the effect of PSN in several subsequent
expansion areas and find no detectable effects. We suggest that the effects
of PSN were diluted as the program expanded to larger areas of the city
without an increase in funding or resources. Still, we recommend that
future research consider PSN’s strategies in Chicago that appeared
effective in the early years and leverage those insights for future programs.
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INTRODUCTION
Project Safe Neighborhoods (PSN) is a federally funded initiative that
brings together federal, state, and local law enforcement with researchers
and community organizations to devise context-specific strategies for
reducing gun violence. Since 2001, Congress has allocated over a billion
dollars to the U.S. Attorney’s Office to oversee PSN programs in the 94
federal districts. 1 Each jurisdiction crafted a set of interventions that
typically included increased federal prosecution of gun crimes.2
Prior case studies 3 and systematic empirical investigations 4 of PSN
have generally been positive. Most recently, a national evaluation examined

1

See EDMUND F. MCGARRELL ET AL., PROJECT SAFE NEIGHBORHOODS—A NATIONAL
PROGRAM TO REDUCE GUN CRIME: FINAL PROJECT REPORT 1 (2009) [hereinafter FINAL
PROJECT REPORT].
2
Id. at iii.
3
See generally EDMUND F. MCGARRELL ET AL., PROJECT SAFE NEIGHBORHOODS:
STRATEGIC INTERVENTIONS, MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA: CASE STUDY 5, at 2 (2007),
https://www.bja.gov/Publications/MD_Alabama.pdf (finding a decrease in some crime
categories, including homicide and gun assault, after the program began); JACK MCDEVITT
ET AL., PROJECT SAFE NEIGHBORHOODS: STRATEGIC INTERVENTIONS, LOWELL, DISTRICT OF
MASSACHUSETTS: CASE STUDY 6, at 2 (2007), https://www.bja.gov/Publications/Lowell_
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the association between PSN dosage and crime in 82 PSN sites and 170
control sites and found that high-dosage PSN sites experienced declines in
violent crime relative to control sites, while low-dosage sites experienced
no change.5
The current study examines the long-term effects of PSN in Chicago,
where the program has operated for over a decade. Given the size of the
city’s population and its high rate of gun violence, the PSN taskforce
initially focused on two of the highest crime police districts. The taskforce
devised three primary strategies. First, it established a case review process
to make strategic decisions about the prosecution of all gun-related cases.
Suitable cases are diverted to federal court where more severe penalties are
often available.6 Second, the taskforce created a multi-agency “gun team” to
investigate gun trafficking cases and trace all recovered firearms.7 Third,
drawing on the experiences of other focused-deterrence initiatives in cities
like Boston and Richmond,8 the PSN team in Chicago developed offender
notification forums in which law enforcement officers and social service
providers meet with parolees and probationers convicted of gun-related
crimes. Forum attendees are cautioned about the consequences of

MA.pdf (observing a reduction in some crime categories, including aggravated assaults with
a firearm, after the program began); see also NATALIE KROOVAND HIPPLE ET AL., PROJECT
SAFE NEIGHBORHOODS CASE STUDY REPORT: DISTRICT OF NEBRASKA (CASE STUDY 9) 23
(2007), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/241727.pdf (observing a reduction in
firearm offenses after the program began).
4
See generally Edmund F. McGarrell et al., Project Safe Neighborhoods and Violent
Crime Trends in US Cities: Assessing Violent Crime Impact, 26 J. QUANTITATIVE
CRIMINOLOGY 165 (2010) [hereinafter Assessing Violent Crime Impact]; FINAL PROJECT
REPORT, supra note 1; Andrew V. Papachristos, Tracey L. Meares & Jeffrey Fagan,
Attention Felons: Evaluating Project Safe Neighborhoods in Chicago, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL
STUD. 223 (2007) (evaluating the effect of PSN Chicago in the first several years of its
operation). But see J.C. Barnes et al., A Partial Assessment of South Carolina’s Project Safe
Neighborhoods Strategy: Evidence from a Sample of Supervised Offenders, 38 J. CRIM.
JUSTICE 383 (2010) (observing an increase in firearm-related crimes after South Carolina’s
PSN program began).
5
Assessing Violent Crime Impact, supra note 4, at 173, 176–77.
6
Papachristos et al., supra note 4, at 233.
7
Id. at 232–33.
8
See, e.g., Anthony A. Braga et al., Problem-Oriented Policing, Deterrence, and Youth
Violence: An Evaluation of Boston’s Operation Ceasefire, 38 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 195
(2001) [hereinafter Problem-Oriented Policing] (examining Boston’s Operation Ceasefire
over a two-year period); Steven Raphael & Jens Ludwig, Prison Sentence Enhancements:
The Case of Project Exile, in EVALUATING GUN POLICY: EFFECTS ON CRIME AND VIOLENCE
251 (Jens Ludwig & Philip J. Cook eds., 2003) (reassessing the impact of Project Exile on
homicide and other crimes).

3. GRUNWALD

134

4/6/2017 6:45 PM

GRUNWALD & PAPACHRISTOS

[Vol. 107

committing further gun crimes and are offered social, educational, health,
and employment services.9
An initial evaluation examined the effects of PSN Chicago from 2002
to 2004. 10 The investigation found evidence that several of these PSN
initiatives reduced violent crime in the two target districts. Modest
reductions in violence were associated with the number of PSN
prosecutions and gun seizures, while larger reductions were associated with
the percentage of eligible offenders who attended an offender notification
forum.11
PSN Chicago did not stop in 2004. On the contrary, the program
continues to this day in the original target districts. And, after the initial
evaluation, PSN swiftly expanded to other areas of the city, often with no
increase in programmatic resources. By 2007, both the case-review process
and the multi-agency gun-teams had expanded citywide. And by 2009, the
offender notification forums were distributed across 24% of the police
districts in the city.
The present study seeks to answer two questions. First, do the original
PSN districts continue to experience programmatic effects years later?
Much has happened in Chicago since 2002, including an unprecedented
decline in the city’s homicide rate to a nearly 48-year low.12 Second, have
PSN expansion districts experienced programmatic effects that are
comparable to those in the original districts? To answer these questions, the
present study builds upon the initial evaluation by examining data that
spans roughly eight years of the program and a larger geographic area.
Evaluations of anti-violence programs like PSN face a series of wellknown methodological challenges. 13 Most importantly, the initial target
areas for PSN were not selected randomly. They were selected precisely
because they had the highest rate of homicide and gun violence in the city.14
Two challenges result. First, non-random selection creates the potential for
9

Papachristos et al., supra note 4, at 231–32.
Id. at 245, 255.
11
Id. at 260.
12
Andrew V. Papachristos, 48 Years of Crime in Chicago: A Descriptive Analysis of
Serious Crime Trends from 1965 to 2013, at 5 (Inst. for Soc. & Policy Studies, Working
Paper No. 13-023, 2013), http://isps.yale.edu/sites/default/publication/2013/12/48yearsof
crime_final_ispsworkingpaper023.pdf.
13
See, e.g., Richard A. Berk, Knowing When to Fold ‘Em: An Essay on Evaluating the
Impact of Ceasefire, Compstat, and Exile, 4 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 451 (2005)
(identifying many of the methodological limitations in the design of observational studies of
anti-violence programs).
14
Papachristos et al., supra note 4, at 242.
10
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bias because we cannot apply an experimental design to evaluate the effects
of the program. Second, PSN’s decision to target the highest crime areas of
the city creates the potential for statistical imprecision because there are few
remaining neighborhoods for our comparison group. This problem is
exacerbated by PSN’s expansion throughout the city. The comparison
groups from the earlier evaluation of PSN Chicago, for example, quickly
became the second set of target areas when the program expanded.
The current study represents our best effort to overcome these
challenges given the data and methodological tools available. We use
propensity score matching to select a set of comparison areas for the
original and expansion PSN districts based on neighborhood-level measures
that are theoretically linked with violence. We apply growth curve and fixed
effect models to estimate the effects on homicide of the dosage of three
main program components: PSN prosecutions, gun seizures, and offender
notification forums.
Our results are as follows. First, in the original PSN areas we find a
modest negative correlation between homicide and the dosage of federal
prosecutions and offender notification forums. These results are sensitive to
some alternative model specifications, which we discuss in greater detail
below. For instance, when we exclude the first three years of PSN from the
analysis, the negative correlation between forum dosage and homicide
decreases dramatically and is no longer statistically significant. This
suggests that PSN may have reduced homicide in its early years, but as with
other similar anti-violence programs, the effects may have dissipated over
time. 15 Second, we find little evidence of programmatic effects in the
expansion areas. Both of these findings may, to some extent, reflect greater
levels of error in our measures of PSN dosage due to changes in data
collection over time.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Part I describes
PSN Chicago, the initial neighborhoods targeted by the program, and the
evaluation by Papachristos et al. It then reviews some of the challenges
faced by the PSN team in sustaining the program over its long life. Part II
describes the design of the current study, and Part III details our results.
Part IV explores the implications of our work for PSN, other anti-violence
programs, and future research.

15

See Robin S. Engel et al., Reducing Gang Violence Using Focused Deterrence:
Evaluating the Cincinnati Initiative to Reduce Violence (CIRV), 30 JUST. Q. 403, 431–32
(2013) (discussing the failure of some anti-violence programs to sustain effects over longer
periods of time).
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I. PSN IN CHICAGO
A. PROGRAM OVERVIEW

As described elsewhere, PSN Chicago is not a single program but a
bundle of interrelated interventions aimed at reducing gun violence in highcrime communities. Since May 2002, the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the
Northern District of Illinois has overseen a PSN taskforce of representatives
from the Chicago Police Department, the Cook County State’s Attorney’s
Office, the Illinois Department of Corrections, the Cook County
Department of Probation, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and
Explosives, the City of Chicago, a group of research partners, and more
than twelve community-based organizations. The taskforce meets monthly
to coordinate PSN operations.16
PSN Chicago consists of three core strategies. First, the taskforce
increased federal prosecutions of gun crimes.17 Prosecuting gun offenders in
federal rather than state court was thought to increase deterrence because
federal prison sentences tend to be longer, federal inmates serve a minimum
of 85% of their sentence, and federal prosecutions have a higher overall
conviction rate.18 To increase the number of federal prosecutions, the PSN
taskforce designed a case review process in which federal and local
prosecutors review all gun cases in Chicago to determine whether to
prosecute in state or federal court.19
Second, the taskforce established a PSN “gun team.” The Chicago
Police Department recovered between 10,000 and 16,000 guns per year
between 1995 and 2002. 20 Yet at the time PSN was established, the
department’s gun-related policing efforts were primarily reactive, occurring
after the commission of a gun crime or else as a supplement to criminal
investigations of other types of offenses. PSN created a multi-agency “gun
team” to investigate supply-side crimes like gun use, sales, and trafficking.
The gun team also conducted seizures and served warrants on pending cases
involving guns.21
16

Papachristos et al., supra note 4, at 229–33.
Id. at 233.
18
Steven D. Clymer, Unequal Justice: The Federalization of Criminal Law, 70 S. CAL.
L. REV. 643, 674–75 (1997).
19
Papachristos et al., supra note 4, at 233.
20
CHI. POLICE DEP’T, 2002 ANNUAL REPORT 15 (2002), https://portal.chicagopolice.
org/portal/page/portal/ClearPath/News/Statistical%20Reports/Annual%20Reports/02Annual
Report.pdf.
21
Papachristos et al., supra note 4, at 233.
17
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Third, the PSN taskforce developed offender notification forums
(forums), one of the program’s most distinctive features. A forum is a
round-table meeting with twelve to twenty offenders who have a history of
gun violence and gang participation, and who were recently assigned to
parole or probation. These hour-long meetings are held in a non-law
enforcement location of civic importance such as a local park building,
community organization, or school.22 The first segment of the meeting lasts
approximately fifteen minutes and stresses deterrence. A panel of local and
federal law enforcement emphasizes the consequences of future gun
offenses, including the likelihood of federal prosecution. In the second
fifteen-minute segment, an ex-offender involved in local crime prevention
programs discusses the seriousness of gun violence in the community and
the real-life struggles that ex-offenders face when re-entering society. The
final segment stresses the choices offenders can make to avoid gun crime.
This thirty-minute segment is presented by service providers, education
specialists, health professionals, and employment counselors, all of whom
offer services and outreach.23
The forums are based on two interrelated principles. First, deterrence
messages should directly target gun offenders.24 Since the vast majority of
the population—including the offending population—does not engage in
gun-related crimes, broad sweeping deterrence strategies are an inefficient
use of limited resources.25 Second, positive interactions with police officers
and prosecutors can increase offenders’ perception of the legitimacy of law
enforcement and may encourage greater compliance with the law.26
PSN originally targeted the 11th and 15th police districts in Chicago,27
which had experienced some of the highest per capita homicide rates in the

22

Id. at 237.
Id. at 231–32.
24
Anthony A. Braga & David L. Weisburd, The Effects of Focused Deterrence
Strategies on Crime: A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis of the Empirical Evidence, 49
J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 323, 327 (2012).
25
In 2010, there were approximately 159,000 arrests for weapons violations. See Crime
in the United States, FBI.GOV, https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2010/
crime-in-the-u.s.-2010/tables/10tbl29.xls (last visited June 30, 2016).
26
See Andrew V. Papachristos, Tracey L. Meares & Jeffrey Fagan, Why Do Criminals
Obey the Law? The Influence of Legitimacy and Social Networks on Active Gun Offenders,
102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 397, 432–35 (2012) (finding that offenders are more likely
to comply with the law when they perceive police are legitimate government actors).
27
At the time PSN began, the Chicago Police Department operated twenty-five police
districts that covered the entire city. These districts were subdivided into roughly 280 “beats”
of approximately one square mile. Districts were selected as the unit of intervention by the
23
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city since the early 1980s. When the program began in 2002, there were
75.5 homicides and 13.8 gang homicides per 100,000 residents in these
districts—over three times the citywide average. 28 The 11th and 15th
districts are located on the west side of the city (see Figure 1), and include
North Lawndale, West Garfield Park, and Austin. They are predominately
African American (97%) and have high levels of poverty, high school
dropout, unemployment, and gang membership.29
Importantly, PSN has never operated in a vacuum. A number of other
programs have emerged over the last 15 years, including Cure Violence
(formerly CeaseFire). 30 Many PSN partners—such as the Chicago Police
Department, the Cook County State’s Attorney’s Office, Cook County
Probation, and the Illinois Department of Corrections—have implemented
various other anti-violence programs.31 And non-profit groups, community
organizations, and churches have organized smaller programs that less
frequently garner media attention. We lack systematic data on these other
programs, but to our knowledge, none were implementing anything like
PSN’s offender notification hearings.

PSN taskforce as they represented the most convenient administrative unit. Most local
policing decisions and resources, for instance, are managed by a district commander. CHI.
POLICE DEP’T, supra note 20, at 22.
28
Papachristos et al., supra note 4, at 242–43.
29
For a thorough description of the development of this area and its relationship to larger
social and historical patterns in Chicago, see ARNOLD R. HIRSCH, MAKING THE SECOND
GHETTO: RACE AND HOUSING IN CHICAGO, 1940–1960 (1983).
30
See WESLEY G. SKOGAN, SUSAN M. HARTNETT, NATALIE BUMP & JILL DUBOIS,
EVALUATION OF CEASEFIRE-CHICAGO, at 1-7 to 1-11 (2008) (describing the CeaseFire model
in Chicago, which included a number of programmatic elements including public health and
educational outreach, anti-violence street intervention, clergy involvement, and community
mobilization).
31
See, e.g., CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK CNTY., Adult Probation Programs,
http://www.cookcountycourt.org/ABOUTTHECOURT/OfficeoftheChiefJudge/Probation
Departments/ProbationforAdults/AdultProbationDepartment/Programs.aspx (follow “Gang
Intervention Unit”) (last visited Nov. 14, 2015) (describing the probation department’s gang
intervention unit, which was established in 1991).
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Figure 1
PSN Treatment Areas & Total Number Homicides in 2002

B. INITIAL EVALUATION: DESIGN AND RESULTS

The initial evaluation by Papachristos et al. examined the effects of
PSN from January 2002 to December 2004 in the 11th and 15th police
districts. 32 The authors addressed the non-random selection of the target
areas in two ways. First, they used the 7th and 9th districts as comparison
areas because they had some of the highest homicide rates in the city and
they were not geographically adjacent to the 11th and 15th.33 Second, they
applied propensity score models to control for known neighborhood-level
measures theoretically linked with violence.34
The investigation represented a significant advancement over previous
evaluations of focused deterrence anti-violence programs in two ways.
32

Papachristos et al., supra note 4, at 245, 255.
Id. at 241–42 (illustrating and discussing the concentration of gun violence in the
study districts).
34
Id. at 253–54.
33
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First, prior evaluations of Boston Ceasefire and Project Exile examined
city-level crime rates even though the interventions targeted narrow
geographic areas and populations. 35 In contrast, the design employed by
Papachristos et al. reduced bias by analyzing smaller geographic units that
were directly targeted by PSN. Second, whereas prior studies identified
programmatic effects based on changes in crime before and after program
implementation, the initial evaluation measured the dosage of program
elements to identify which elements were associated with changes in
crime.36
The initial investigation of the first three years of the program found
that several PSN initiatives were associated with statistically significant
declines in homicide. Overall, the PSN target communities experienced a
37% drop in homicide.37 Small to moderate reductions in homicide were
associated with the number of federal prosecutions and recovered guns. The
largest reductions were associated with the proportion of eligible offenders
who attended an offender notification forum.38 A follow-up study reports
that eligible offenders who attended a forum spent less time in prison than
those that did not.39
C. PROGRAM EXPANSION AND OTHER CHANGES IN CHICAGO

Even before the publication of the initial evaluation, PSN expanded
quickly throughout the city of Chicago. Both the prosecutorial case review
and the gun team went citywide by the end of 2004 (though PSN districts
continued to receive priority status for the former). The forums expanded
more slowly. In 2005, the PSN taskforce selected the 7th and 9th districts as
the next PSN target areas (see Figure 1). These districts cover largely
African American neighborhoods with high levels of poverty, high school
dropout, unemployment, and violence. In 2006, the program expanded
again to the 10th and 4th districts. Thus by 2009, a program that began as a
35

Problem-Oriented Policing, supra note 8, at 203–18; Anne Morrison Piehl et al.,
Testing for Structural Breaks in the Evaluation of Programs, 85 REV. ECON. & STAT. 550,
551–53 (2003); Raphael & Ludwig, supra note 8, at 256–77; Richard Rosenfeld et al., Did
Ceasefire, Compstat, and Exile Reduce Homicide?, 4 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 419, 428–
31 (2005).
36
Papachristos et al., supra note 4, at 247–49.
37
Id. at 254.
38
Id. at 256–58.
39
Andrew V. Papachristos, Danielle M. Wallace, Tracey L. Meares & Jeffrey Fagan,
Desistance and Legitimacy: The Impact of Offender Notification Meetings on Recidivism
Among High Risk Offenders 18 (Columbia Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working
Paper Grp., Paper No. 13-343, 2013), http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2240232.
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targeted effort in just 8% of the city’s police districts spread to 24%. Today,
PSN includes nearly all of the city’s high-crime police districts.
Unfortunately, the expansion of the program was not accompanied by
an increase in funding or personnel.40 Finite resources were spread across a
larger area of the city and program efficacy may have suffered as a result.
For example, at the program’s inception two forums were held each month
in the two original PSN districts. By 2006, the two bimonthly forums were
split across six districts on a rotating basis. As a result, the aggressive
expansion may have overstretched the program’s resources.
In the later years of the program, PSN faced a number of other
common challenges in maintaining the “network of capacity” essential to its
early success.41 First, focused-deterrence programs often rely on a complex
web of agencies and organizations for key services and support. 42 As
priorities shift and budgets change, these large coalitions sometimes drift
apart. As just one example, the Ceasefire program in Boston became less
effective over time because an organization of African American clergymen
withdrew from the initiative. 43 Without the clergy, the program lacked
sufficient community support and capacity to engage in critical street-level
services.44 While less extreme, PSN faced similar challenges in Chicago as
dozens of community groups participated in varying ways throughout the
first decade of the program. Several grassroots organizations that originally
participated in the forums ceased to operate. A small group composed of
fathers of homicide victims, for example, ceased to exist because of
members’ other commitments. Small health care providers and drug
outreach organizations also came and went as their staffing and funding
demands fluctuated. To address these service gaps, PSN quickly sought out
new partner organizations.
40

Resources here refer not just to money, but also manpower. The PSN team remained a
small and dedicated group of individuals. The PSN forums occurred after normal working
hours, and PSN team and community members participated in such meetings without
compensation.
41
Mark H. Moore, Creating Networks of Capacity: The Challenge of Managing
Society’s Response to Youth Violence, in SECURING OUR CHILDREN’S FUTURE: NEW
APPROACHES TO JUVENILE JUSTICE AND YOUTH VIOLENCE 338, 372 (Gary S. Katzmann ed.,
2002).
42
Id. at 372–75.
43
See, e.g., Anthony A. Braga et al., Losing Faith? Police, Black Churches, and the
Resurgence of Youth Violence in Boston, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 141, 156, 160–62 (2008)
[hereinafter Losing Faith?] (describing the effect of the withdrawal of a group of clergymen
from the Ceasefire program).
44
Id.
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Second, mounting an effective anti-violence program requires
tremendous organizational skill and personal investment. Turnover in
personnel can thus create significant challenges.45 Prior team members may
be replaced by individuals with fewer skills or a weaker commitment to the
program’s strategy. Boston’s Operation Ceasefire once again provides a
useful example as it ended soon after the “operational steward” of the
program, a lieutenant in the police department, was transferred to a different
unit.46
The PSN team experienced significant personnel turnover. Since it
began in 2002, there have been two U.S. Attorneys in the Northern District
of Illinois, five different Assistant U.S. Attorneys leading daily PSN
operations, four police superintendents, ten police commanders, two Cook
County State’s Attorneys, two mayors, and three different fiscal agents
monitoring grant activities.47 At times, prior team members were replaced
by new personnel with weaker commitments to the program’s core
principles and strategy. To help address these problems, the PSN
coordinators and core support team had to conduct several “reboot”
trainings to promote buy-in among new personnel and ensure continued
fidelity in the offender notification forums. Thus, despite turnover, PSN
remained faithful to most of its core programmatic elements, especially
prosecutorial review and the forums.
II. RESEARCH DESIGN AND DATA
The present study has two main objectives. First, it examines data on
the effect of PSN in the original PSN districts that span a period of roughly
eight years. Second, it tests whether PSN expansion districts experienced
effects similar to the initial districts.
The non-random selection of the original PSN sites in Chicago poses
serious challenges for causal inference. The non-random expansion of the
program further exacerbates the problem. It is, therefore, impossible to test
the effect of PSN with a randomized experiment. Instead, we use propensity
score matching to select a set of comparison neighborhoods that are similar
in historical rates of homicide and in theoretical measures associated with
45

Moore, supra note 41, at 372, 376–77.
Losing Faith?, supra note 43, at 156.
47
See, e.g., Meet Anita, ANITAALVAREZ.COM, http://www.anitaalvarez.com/meet-anita/
(last visited June 30, 2016) (noting that Anita Alvarez was elected as the Cook County
State’s Attorney in 2008); About the Mayor, CITYOFCHICAGO.ORG, http://www.cityofchicago.
org/city/en/depts/mayor/supp_info/about_the_mayor.html (last visited Nov. 14, 2015)
(noting that Rahm Emanuel was elected Mayor of Chicago in 2011).
46
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violence. We then fit fixed effects and growth curve models on beat-level
data from 1999 to 2010 to estimate the relationship between measures of
PSN dosage and homicide. We begin by describing our strategy for
selecting comparison beats and then discuss our models.
A. CHOOSING COMPARISON BEATS

Our unit of analysis is the police beat, the smallest geographic unit
used by the Chicago Police Department for which data are consistently
available over time. For convenience, we refer to (1) police beats that
received PSN as the treatment group, (2) beats that did not receive PSN as
the control group, and (3) beats in the control group that are selected as
comparison beats for our analysis as the matched control group.
To estimate propensity scores for all beats in the city, we fit a logistic
regression model on a dummy variable indicating whether each beat is in a
PSN area (1 = yes, 0 = no). Given the manner in which the program
expanded, we estimate the logistic regression twice: first, with a dependent
variable indicating whether a beat is in the original PSN target areas (the
11th and 15th districts) and then again with a dependent variable indicating
whether a beat was in one of the expansion areas (the 7th and 9th districts).
These two logistic models estimate the propensity score for each beat at the
two selection stages.
The logistic regression models contain six independent variables. The
first three variables are neighborhood-level characteristics that are known
correlates of violent crime: socio-economic deprivation, concentrated
immigration, and residential stability. 48 These measures were derived
through principal components analysis from twelve census variables.49 Two
further variables indicate the number of homicides in each beat in the two
years prior to PSN implementation. The final variable is the size of the
residential population.
Next, we use the propensity scores from the logistic regression to
select non-PSN beats that are similar to PSN beats. In order to increase
balance on relevant covariates, we specify the matching algorithm to favor
matched pairs that are not only similar on propensity scores but also on the
covariates with which we fit the logistic regression models.50 Importantly,

48

See Robert J. Sampson & W. Byron Groves, Community Structure and Crime: Testing
Social-Disorganization Theory, 94 AM. J. SOC. 774, 780–81 (1989) (discussing the
theoretical significance of these neighborhood-level characteristics).
49
For a more detailed description, see Papachristos et al., supra note 4, at 246.
50
See PAUL R. ROSENBAUM, DESIGN OF OBSERVATIONAL STUDIES 168–72 (2010).
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all police beats that have been selected as PSN target areas were dropped
before matching to ensure they were not selected as matched controls.51 A
matched control group was selected for each of the two stages of site
selection. In the first stage, twenty-four matched control beats were selected
for each of the twenty-four treatment beats in the 11th and 15th districts; in
the second stage, thirty matched control beats were selected for each of the
thirty treatment beats in the 7th and 9th districts. We considered selecting a
larger number of matched control beats to increase statistical power, but
found an insufficient number of similar beats to do so.
A comparison of pre-treatment covariates in the 11th and 15th districts
reveals that propensity score matching has dramatically increased the
comparability of the treatment and control group.52 Though the shapes of
some of the distributions differ in the treatment and matched control
group,53 the means of the distributions are all similar. Most importantly, the
distributions of the propensity score in the treatment and matched control
group are similar. Moreover, on average, there were 4 and 4.2 homicides in
2000 in the treatment and matched control group respectively. In the next
year, there were 4.6 and 4.4 respectively. Beats in both treatment and
matched control groups had an average population size just over 6,300. A
comparison of pre-treatment covariates reveals a similar pattern of results
for the 7th and 9th districts (see Appendix Figure 2). The distributions of
the propensity scores in the treatment and matched control group are
relatively similar. The average number of homicides per beat in 2003 was
approximately 3.1 in the treatment group and 2.3 in the matched control
group. In 2004, the average number of homicides was 2.3 in the treatment
group and 2 in the matched control group. Treatment beats had an average
of 8,700 residents, while matched control beats had a higher average of
9,700 residents.
To assess balance between the treatment and matched control groups
more systematically, we applied the t-test and Wilcoxon ranked sum test to
each of the variables.54 The only statistically significant difference at the .05
level was in the immigrant concentration variable for the first site selection.
51

Thus, the 11th and 15th were dropped because they were the first PSN areas. The 7th
and 9th were also dropped because PSN expanded there in 2005. And, finally, the 4th and
10th were also dropped because PSN expanded there later.
52
See infra Appendix Figure 1.
53
Some distributional differences are to be expected due to the relatively small number
of beats in the treatment and matched control groups.
54
Unlike the t-test, the Wilcoxon ranked sum test does not assume normality. See MYLES
HOLLANDER & DOUGLAS A. WOLFE, NONPARAMETRIC STATISTICAL METHODS 36–37 (2d ed.
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Ideally, the treatment and matched control group would be equivalent
on all variables that affect the homicide rate. In practice, this goal was
difficult to achieve. First, we may not have all relevant variables that affect
homicide. Second, the program has expanded to cover roughly 20% of all
beats in the city, capturing most neighborhoods with high levels of violence
and predominately African American populations. PSN thus already
encompasses most of the neighborhoods in the city that could serve as
viable comparisons. As noted, the initial evaluation of PSN used the 7th and
9th districts as comparison groups for the 11th and 15th PSN areas, but the
program has since expanded to the 7th and 9th districts.
Ultimately, the similarity between the treatment and matched control
groups is not ideal relative to other non-policing studies in the evaluation
literature. However, the use of propensity score matching in the evaluation
of criminal justice programs like PSN presents unique challenges because
of the nature of gun violence, which can never be truly randomized, and the
politics and practical implementations of such programs. The use of
propensity score matching in criminal justice research is still in its infancy
and our matching procedures do appear to substantially improve the control
group. Under these circumstances, it may be more desirable to fit the model
with all observations and control for observable covariates rather than to fit
the model on a matched control group selected on the basis of the
observable covariates. We refit our fixed effect model with all beats in the
city (excluding beats in other PSN target districts) and added a variable
indicating the propensity score for each beat. The results were substantively
similar.
B. ANALYTIC MODELS

We fit two different models to estimate the effect of PSN dosage on
homicide in Chicago. First, we fit a fixed effect model with a fixed intercept
and slope for time for each beat. Including slopes for time for each beat can
lead to large standard errors, but the results are substantively similar when
the slopes are removed from the models. Second, we fit a growth curve
model with a random intercept and slope for time for each beat.55
1999). The value of both tests is limited given the small sample sizes.
55
Our growth curve model was a two-level model predicting within-beat trajectories at
level 1 and between-beat trajectories at level 2 using the predicted level 1 intercepts and
slopes as outcomes. We estimate the following model:
represents a matrix of constant and time varying covariates,
where
random intercept for beats, and
represents a random slope for time.

represents a
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We fit these models on a panel data set for all beats in the 11th and
15th districts and their matched controls, where each beat has a row for
each year-quarter from 1999 to 2010. We then refit the models on a similar
dataset for the 7th and 9th districts and their matched controls. The results
of both the fixed effect and growth curve models are substantively similar.
We, therefore, present the results of the fixed effect models, which are more
resistant to unobserved bias.
We model two dependent variables: total homicide and gun homicide.
Both variables are logged. 56 Our models include six main independent
variables. First, we include a variable indicating whether a beat is a PSN
treatment beat (1 = yes, 0 = no). Second, we include a time-varying dummy
variable indicating whether PSN was in operation during a particular yearquarter (1 = yes, 0 = no). For the 11th and 15th districts, we set the PSN
start date as January 2002, and for the 7th and 9th, the start date is January
2005. Third, we include a count variable representing the number of ATF
gun traces in each beat in each period; this variable acts as a proxy for gun
seizures. Fourth, we include the log of the number of PSN prosecutions in
each beat in each period. Fifth and related to the fourth variable, we also
consider a measure of the log of the average PSN sentence in each beat in
each period. Finally, we include a variable that measures the log of the
estimated number of residents that attended a PSN offender notification
forum in each beat in each period.57
All of the data used in this study were provided by the agencies
participating in PSN, including the Chicago Police Department, the United
States Attorney’s Office of the Northern District of Illinois, and the Bureau
of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives. Changes in personnel and
data collection procedures over time present special challenges in both
replicating the original variables used by the initial evaluation and in
creating consistent measures for the entire study period. This problem was
particularly acute for the measure of the number of attendees at PSN
offender notification forums.58 We faced two problems in particular. First,
we were unable to locate attendee data from 2007 and 2008. We imputed
forum data in each beat for this period with a best-fit line and added random
56
Because some values for the dependent variable were zero, we added an offset of
0.0001 to the dependent variable before transforming to the log scale.
57
As with the dependent variables, we added an offset of 0.0001 to all logged measures
because some values were equal to zero.
58
Unlike Papachristos et al., supra note 4, we measure forum dosage by the absolute
number of participants rather than the proportion of eligible attendants to promote easier
interpretation of the results.
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error using the mean of the absolute value of the residuals from the model.
We present models that include the imputed data for 2007 and 2008, but the
results for the forum variable were substantively similar when these years
were excluded. Second, data from 2003 to 2006 were only available at the
zipcode-level. We therefore imputed the number of forum participants from
zipcode to beat through areal interpolation. For 2009 and 2010, we
measured forum attendance by summing the number of forum attendees in
each beat at each year-quarter. Precise address-level data for this period
were available on a significant fraction of all forum attendees from the 11th
and 15th (54%) and 7th and 9th districts (66%).59
Figure 2 depicts the total number of forum attendees per year-quarter
in the two PSN treatment areas. Roughly twenty-five to thirty participants
attended the forums in the 11th and 15th districts per quarter in 2003.
Importantly, Figure 2 also shows that the number of forum attendees in the
11th and 15th districts decreased gradually over time, especially as the
program expanded to the 7th and 9th districts. The number of forum
participants in the 7th and 9th districts increased over time, peaking at
roughly twenty-five to thirty participants per quarter in 2009 and 2010.

59

Because we are missing a non-trivial fraction of attendees for 2009 and 2010, we also
created a second measure of forum attendance for these years. Data on the total number of
all forum attendees in each year-quarter were available at the district-couplet level, that is,
the combined number of forum participants in the 11th and 15th districts, and the 7th and 9th
districts in each year-quarter from 2009 to 2010. Data was also available on the number of
parolees eligible for a PSN forum during each year-quarter at the zipcode-level. We imputed
the zipcode-level eligibility data to the beat-level using areal interpolation. Then, assuming
that PSN forum participants were distributed proportionately to the number of eligible
participants in each beat in each year-quarter, we imputed the total number of participants in
each district couplet at each year-quarter to the beat-level. The results for both measures
produced broadly similar results. We present models based on the first measure, which we
believe is subject to substantially less error.
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Figure 2
Estimated Aggregate Number of Forum Participants in the
11th & 15th Districts and the 7th & 9th Districts60
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III. RESULTS
Figures 3 and 4 display the average homicide rate per beat in each
year-quarter for the PSN treatment areas. The vertical dotted line indicates
the start date of the program in each area. The black line represents the
average number of homicides per beat in the treatment group, and the gray
line represents the average number of homicides per beat in the matchedcomparison group. Overall, Figure 3 shows that homicide has decreased by
approximately 10% since the start of PSN in the 11th and 15th districts. The
steepest decline in both the treatment and matched control groups continues
until 2006. Since that year, both areas’ homicide rates have risen slightly,
but they remain lower than the pre-PSN levels. Figure 4 shows that
homicide rates in the 7th and 9th districts are more stable but also
experienced a steady decline reaching a low point in 2006. In both areas,
homicide rates reached their respective lowest points around that year and
have risen slightly since. In the following models, we attempt to estimate
whether any beat-level declines in homicide can be attributed to the dosage
of PSN activities.
60

As noted, data on the number of forum recipients for 2007 and 2008 is not available.
The data presented for those years is imputed.
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Figure 3
Average Homicide Per Beat in 11th and 15th Districts and
Matched Control Group
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Figure 4
Average Homicide Per Beat in 7th and 9th Districts
and Matched Control Group
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The results from our analyses provide insights into both the sustained
effects within the original PSN districts and the effects in the expansion
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districts. Tables 1 and 2 present the coefficients and standard errors (in
parentheses) from our regression models for the original and expansion
PSN districts.61
Table 1 displays the results of the fixed effect model for the 11th and
15th police districts using data from 1999 to 2010. Several key findings
emerge. First, the PSN Operating coefficient is negative in both the total
homicide and gun homicide models, showing a substantial and statistically
significant decrease in homicides when PSN is in operation.
Table 1
Fixed Effect Models on Logged Total and Gun Homicide,
11th & 15th Districts
Total Homicide
B
p-value
-1.41
PSN Operating
0.002
(.460)
0.047
Trace
0.027
(.021)
-0.249
log(Prosecution)
0.001
(.076)
0.237
log(Sentence)
0.000
(.066)
-0.093
log(Forum)
0.006
(.034)
-0.04
Year-Quarter
0.009
(.015)
Fixed Intercepts for 48 Beats
Yes
Fixed Slopes for 48 Beats
Yes
Note: Bold coefficients are significant at the .05 level

Gun Homicide
B
p-value
-1.06
0.014
(.433)
0.044
0.031
(.020)
-0.221
0.006
(.080)
0.236
0.000
(.066)
-0.103
0.001
(.032)
-0.066
0.000
(.014)
Yes
Yes

Second, the coefficients for both of the prosecutorial variables are
statistically significant. The logged number of prosecutions is negative and
statistically significant for both overall homicides and gun homicides. The
coefficient is -0.249 for total homicides and -.221 for gun homicides, which
means that a 1% increase in PSN prosecutions is associated with a .25%
decrease in total homicides per beat and a 0.24% decrease in gun homicides
per beat. The sentence length parameter is positive and statistically
significant in both the total and gun homicide models, indicating that higher
sentence lengths are associated with more homicides; in this case, the
61

We present cluster-robust standard errors clustered by beat.
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positive association could reflect the association between higher sentences
in federal prosecution and the overall more serious nature of crimes
diverted to federal court (i.e., very few low-level, nonviolent crimes make
their way to federal court). It is important to note once again that the total
number of federal PSN prosecutions is low relative to the overall number of
gun cases in the city. Furthermore, the average number of cases taken to
federal court has declined over the life of the PSN program. In 2005, the
State of Illinois developed its own “armed habitual criminal” statute that
enhanced penalties for gun offenders in state court.62 As a result, cases that
might have previously been selected for federal prosecution may have
remained in the state system.
Third, the parameter estimates for the number of guns traced is
positive and statistically significant, which suggests that as the number of
guns recovered in a beat increases, the number of homicides also increases.
Surprisingly, this finding runs contrary to that of Papachristos et al., who
found a negative association between gun traces and homicides. 63 This
directional reversal may arise from changes in the practice of firearms
tracing and gun policing more generally in Chicago. When PSN began in
2002, Chicago’s comprehensive tracing program had fallen behind in trace
requests; some members of the PSN team also believed that gun seizures
had diminished as a policing priority. Getting tracing back on track and
making gun seizures a priority became a central goal of PSN, especially
within the treatment areas. The formation of the PSN gun teams was viewed
as an important step in renewing these commitments to gun policing efforts.
Figure 5 plots the annual number of firearms traced and the homicide rate
(times 10) during the observation period. The shaded area displays the
initial PSN evaluation period. While it is impossible to place causal weight
on this explanation, Figure 5 provides suggestive evidence that the original
finding by Papachristos et al. captured a unique point in time when gun
seizures and traces were at a low point. With the exception of the early
years of PSN, Figure 5 shows that the trends between gun traces and
homicides are roughly parallel: more guns are recovered in years with more
homicides. Whether or not this change in seizures and subsequent tracing
can be attributed to PSN is not something we can answer with our data. But
the timing of these changes shows that PSN started at an important time for
gun policing and gun tracing efforts in Chicago.

62
63

720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/ § 24–1.7 (2005).
Papachristos et al., supra note 4, at 258.
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Figure 5
Annual Number of Gun Traces and Homicides (times 10) in Chicago,
2000 to 2010

Finally, our model in Table 1 provides evidence of an effect for the
number of forum attendees. The coefficient is -.093 for the total homicide
model and -0.103 for the gun homicide model. This means that a 1%
increase in the number of PSN forum attendees is associated with a 0.1%
decrease in homicide and a 0.11% decrease in gun homicide. The results are
generally consistent with the prior evaluation, which also found that the
forums were associated with a statistically significant reduction in total and
gun homicides in the 11th and 15th police districts.64
Results from the 11th and 15th districts are sensitive to several
alternative model specifications. First, excluding data on the first three
years of the program (2002–2004) leads to dramatically smaller coefficients
for the forum variable that are not statistically significant (not shown),
suggesting that some of the results in Table 1 are driven by the initial period
of the program. Second, in our main model we set the start of PSN in the
11th and 15th districts as January of 2002, but not all of the PSN programs
started at that time. The first offender notification forum did not take place
until the next year. Setting the start date for PSN in the 11th and 15th
districts as January of 2003 cuts the coefficient for the forum variable in
64

Id. at 256–57.
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half and renders it statistically insignificant. We believe that 2002 is the
more appropriate start date as other aspects of PSN—including the gun
teams, prosecutorial efforts, and media outreach—were all underway;
nonetheless, sensitivity in the results warrant caution in interpreting our
models.
Table 2 presents our models for the expansion of PSN to the 7th and
9th districts. Consistent with the models for the 11th and 15th, the number
of ATF gun traces is positively correlated with homicide. In contrast to the
11th and 15th districts, however, the models detect no statistically
significant association for either the number of forum participants or PSN
prosecutions. The parameters are directionally consistent but much smaller
and not statistically significant.65
A number of matched control beats in our primary analysis are directly
adjacent to a PSN district (e.g., 7th, 9th, 11th, or 15th) or are located in
districts that are adjacent to a PSN district. This raises the possibility of
program-effect “spill over.” To accommodate for this problem, we
estimated two alternative model specifications. One set of models selected
comparison beats excluding all districts that are adjacent to any PSN
districts. Unsurprisingly, this selection procedure left an insufficient
number of comparable non-PSN beats to achieve adequate balance on pretreatment covariates. In a second set of models, we selected comparison
beats by excluding all beats that are directly adjacent to PSN districts. This
matching strategy produced a matched comparison group with less balance
on pre-treatment covariates than the primary matched comparison group,
but the difference is not dramatic. The results of the analysis for this
alternative matched control group were substantively similar to our primary
results.

65

Notably, additional models not shown here using the second measure of forum
participation estimate directionally consistent coefficients that were close to being
statistically significant at the .05 level. We place greater trust in the measure of forum
recipients presented in Table 2, which, while also subject to some error, provides a more
accurate beat-level measure of forum participants in the later years of the analysis.
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Table 2
Fixed Effects Models on Logged Total and Gun Homicide,
7th & 9th Districts

PSN Operating
Trace
log(Prosecution)
log(Sentence)
log(Forum)
Year-Quarter

Total Homicide
B
p-value
-0.046
0.907
(.397)
0.035
0.027
(.016)
-0.109
0.147
(.075)
0.084
0.207
(.066)
-0.027
0.533
(.043)
-0.080
0.000
(.015)

Fixed Intercepts for 48 Beats
Yes
Fixed Slopes for 48 Beats
Yes
Note: Bold coefficients are significant at the .05 level

Gun Homicide
B
p-value
-0.286
0.463
(.389)
0.041
0.004
(.015)
-0.109
0.112
(.068)
0.094
0.100
(.055)
-0.040
0.352
(.042)
-0.085
0.000
(.015)
Yes
Yes

IV. DISCUSSION & LIMITATIONS
The initial evaluation of PSN Chicago found that the dosage of several
program components was negatively correlated with total homicide and gun
homicide in the initial target areas.66 The authors found a particularly strong
negative correlation between homicide and offender notification forums.
Years later, PSN continues to operate in the original target communities and
has also expanded to other high-crime areas of the city.
The current study sought to answer two questions. First, do the original
PSN target communities continue to experience positive programmatic
effects years later? Second, have subsequent PSN target districts
experienced programmatic effects that are comparable to those in the initial
target districts? With respect to the first question, we find a continued—
albeit smaller—negative correlation between the outcome variables and the
number of forum participants and PSN prosecutions. A decade after PSN
began we can still detect programmatic effects in the original treatment

66

See Papachristos et al., supra note 4, at 254–59.
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communities, at least in the first three years of the program’s operation. Our
models detected little evidence, however, of programmatic effects
associated with the expansion to the 7th and 9th police districts.
Given the longevity of PSN Chicago and the differences between the
results of the current analysis and that of the initial evaluation, it is worth
considering why the results vary by time and police district.
We believe two theoretical considerations provide the most plausible
answers. First, the effects of large-scale social interventions can dissipate
over time. It is possible, for example, that focused deterrence strategies like
PSN exert a short-term shock on homicide rates that dissipates over time as
residents become accustomed to the new and more punitive criminal justice
“regime.” Although some studies have examined the effect of focuseddeterrence strategies over several years, there is little empirical evidence in
the literature on the effects of such strategies over the long term.67
Second, changes in the implementation and activities of the program
may also explain why we observe smaller correlations between program
elements and homicide rates in the later years. Perhaps most importantly,
the expansion of PSN to other areas of the city may have diluted the
treatment dosage in the original PSN districts. By 2009, PSN expanded to
24% of all police districts without any increase in program resources.
Program dilution may also help explain why we observe little evidence of a
reduction in violence in the expansion districts.68 Indeed, the 7th and 9th
districts are considerably larger in terms of both geography and
population.69 These areas may have never achieved the kind of “saturation”
67

One study examined the effect of the Cincinnati Initiative to Reduce Violence over a
3.5-year period. See Engel et al., supra note 15. Two others have examined Boston’s
Operation Ceasefire program, first over a two-year period in the 1990s, and then again over a
four-year period in the 2000s when it started back up again in response to a resurgence in
juvenile crime. See Problem-Oriented Policing, supra note 8; Anthony A. Braga, David M.
Hureau & Andrew V. Papachristos, Deterring Gang-Involved Gun Violence: Measuring the
Impact of Boston’s Operation Ceasefire on Street Gang Behavior, 30 J. QUANT.
CRIMINOLOGY 113 (2014).
68
See, e.g., Losing Faith?, supra note 43, at 156–57 (2008) (arguing that the ability of
the City of Boston to combat youth violence decreased over time as its anti-violence
strategies were expanded “to a broader range of problems such as investigating unsolved
shootings, the re-entry of incarcerated violent offenders back into high-risk Boston
neighborhoods, and criminogenic families in hot spot areas”).
69
See CHI. POLICE DEP’T, 2006 ANNUAL REPORT 31 (2006), https://portal. chicago
police.org/portal/page/portal/ClearPath/News/Statistical%20Reports/Annual%20Reports/06
ARRev_2.pdf (stating that the total population in the 11th and 15th districts is 155,128, and
in the 7th and 9th is almost 260,000); see supra Figure 1 (showing that the 7th and 9th
districts are larger geographically than the 11th and 15th).
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that took place in the original PSN areas. If dilution is responsible for the
diminished effects in the expansion areas, then policymakers should
hesitate to expand effective PSN programs to new geographic areas unless
commensurate resources are available. Future research may test these two
theoretical explanations by examining long-term focused-deterrence
interventions that invest a stable level of resources in the original target area
throughout the study period.
Several methodological considerations may also help explain the
divergent results in the current paper and the initial evaluation by
Papachristos et al. First, they used the 7th and 9th districts as comparison
areas for the 11th and 15th districts because of similarities in homicide rates
and socio-ecological neighborhood features. Since PSN later expanded to
these areas of the city, we are unable to use them as comparison beats. To
overcome the small number of plausible comparison neighborhoods left
untreated by PSN, we used propensity score matching to select matched
control beats from across the city. Second, our measure of PSN forums
differs somewhat from the measure used in the earlier evaluation.
Papachristos et al. measured the treatment dosage as a proportion of eligible
parolees who attended a PSN forum while we measure the total number of
forum participants. More importantly, our measures of PSN attendance in
the later years of the study are subject to greater error due to changes in
data-collection practice over time.70 For two years, we have no forum data
at all. This higher level of error likely attenuated the magnitude of our
estimates.71
Before concluding, we offer several additional words of caution in
interpreting the results of our models. First, as noted earlier, we observed
imperfect balance on pre-treatment covariates and propensity scores
between the treatment and matched control groups. The treatment and
matched control groups may also differ on other relevant variables that we
were unable to observe. For example, research on “neighborhood effects”
consistently shows the importance of various social processes and structures
that are related to neighborhood-level crime rates, which we are unable to

70
Specifically, our first measure of the forums is missing a significant fraction of all
participants. Our second measure involves imputation, both from the zipcode-level to the
beat-level, and from the district-level to the beat-level. Both measures produced results that
are similar in direction and magnitude, reinforcing confidence in our results.
71
See JEFFREY M. WOOLDRIDGE, ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS OF CROSS SECTION AND PANEL
DATA 81 (2d ed. 2010).
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capture in our data.72 These considerations further limit the strength of our
causal inferences.
Second, some of the matched control beats in our analysis are either
directly adjacent to a PSN district or are located in districts that are adjacent
to a PSN district, which raises the possibility of program-effect “spill over.”
To address this problem, we fit an alternative model specification that
excluded all beats directly adjacent to PSN districts. Although this matching
strategy produced a matched comparison group with less balance on pretreatment covariates than the primary matched comparison group, the
results of our models were substantively similar.
Chicago’s PSN program is one of the longest running and most
rigorously studied violence prevention programs. The initial evaluation
found statistically significant negative correlations between homicide and
the dosage of PSN initiatives in the first few years of their operation. The
current study finds similar results for that period, but little evidence of an
effect in subsequent years. Something seems to have happened in those
early years that is associated with reductions in violence in high-crime
communities. We cannot be sure why the dramatic short-term effects did
not sustain over time or extend to other areas of the city. But future research
would do well to consider the strategies that were effective in the early
years and leverage those insights for future programs.

72

See, e.g., Sampson & Groves, supra note 48, at 780–82.
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Appendix Figure 1
Comparison of Pre-Treatment Covariates for the
11th and 15th Districts
Social Deprivation
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Appendix Figure 2
Comparison of Pre-Treatment Covariates for the
7th and 9th Districts
Social Deprivation
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